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Notes on "Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs"

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  • Atsushi Kajii

    (Kyoto Instititute of Economic Research)

  • Stephen Morris

    (Princeton University)

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Suggested Citation

  • Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Notes on "Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs"," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 006, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:upd:utmpwp:006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2009. "Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1726-1769, July.
    2. Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 1-44, January.
    3. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    4. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2010. "Robust equilibria under non-common priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 752-784, March.
    5. Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi, 2005. "Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 45-78, September.
    6. Nora, Vladyslav & Uno, Hiroshi, 2014. "Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 866-877.
    7. Ori Haimanko & Atsushi Kajii, 2016. "Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 839-857, November.
    8. Frick, Mira & Romm, Assaf, 2015. "Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 56-71.
    9. Kota Murayama, 2015. "Robust Predictions under Finite Depth of Reasoning," Discussion Paper Series DP2015-28, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    10. Honda, Jun, 2011. "Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: A symmetric 3×3 example," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 663-669.
    11. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 683-688.
    12. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-391, June.
    13. repec:the:publsh:2734 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Germano, Fabrizio & Weinstein, Jonathan & Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 0. "Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    15. Chassang, Sylvain & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
    16. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    17. Ui, Takashi, 2001. "Robust Equilibria of Potential Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1373-1380, September.
    18. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
    19. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
    20. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2016. "Common belief foundations of global games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 826-848.
    21. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R., 2011. "Every symmetric 3×3 global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 749-754.
    22. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2620-2637.
    23. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru, 2015. "Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: The bilingual game and general supermodular games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 100-127.
    24. repec:eee:mateco:v:75:y:2018:i:c:p:13-18 is not listed on IDEAS
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