Additional Forms of Employee Representation in Australia
Additional forms of employee representation (AFER) may be defined as any representative mechanism which exists alongside or instead of trade unions, which historically have been the most common form of employee representation in Australia. Little is known about how AFER are composed, their independence from managerial influence, the 'representativeness' of such bodies, and their accountability. In addition, little has been documented about the impact of such structures on either the managerial objective of securing consent to organisational change or the employee objective of influencing managerial decisions. This paper attempts to address these issues by examining AFER structures in Australia.
|Date of creation:||2001|
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