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Foreign Aid as Prize: Incentives for a Pro-Poor Policy

  • Sayanak, Tejashree
  • Lahiri, Sajal

We develop a theoretical model of foreign aid to analyse a method of disbursement of aid which induces the recipient government to follow a more pro-poor policy than it otherwise would do. In our two-period model, aid is given in the second period and the volume of it depends on the level of wellbeing of the target group in the first period. We find that this way of designing aid does increase the welfare of the poor. We also consider the situations where the donor and the recipient governments act simultaneously as well as sequentially, and find that by moving first in a sequential game, the donor country can, under certain conditions, increase the welfare of the poor and its own compared to the case of simultaneous moves.

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File URL: http://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/rp2008-63.pdf
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Paper provided by World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) in its series Working Paper Series with number RP2008/63.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:rp2008-63
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  1. Alesina, Alberto & Weder, Beatrice, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," Scholarly Articles 4553011, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. George Mavrotas, 2005. "Aid heterogeneity: looking at aid effectiveness from a different angle," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(8), pages 1019-1036.
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  8. Carl-Johan Dalgaard & Henrik Hansen & Finn Tarp, 2001. "On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth," EPRU Working Paper Series 03-13, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Sep 2003.
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  10. Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 381-402, April.
  11. Swaroop, Vinaya & Jha, Shikha & Sunil Rajkumar, Andrew, 2000. "Fiscal effects of foreign aid in a federal system of governance: The case of India," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 307-330, September.
  12. Paul Collier & David Dollar, 2004. "Development effectiveness: what have we learnt?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(496), pages F244-F271, 06.
  13. Khilji, Nasir M. & Zampelli, Ernest M., 1994. "The fungibility of U.S. military and non-military assistance and the impacts on expenditures of major aid recipients," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 345-362, April.
  14. Mosley, Paul & Hudson, John & Horrell, Sara, 1987. "Aid, the Public Sector and the Market in Less Developed Countries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 616-41, September.
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  16. C. S. Adam & S. A. O'Connell, 1999. "Aid, Taxation and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 225-253, November.
  17. Boone, Peter, 1996. "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 289-329, February.
  18. Sajal Lahiri & Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, 2004. "Donor Strategy under the Fungibility of Foreign Aid," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 213-231, 07.
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