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Foreign Aid as Prize: Incentives for a Pro‐Poor Policy

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  • Tejashree Sayanak
  • Sajal Lahiri

Abstract

The authors develop a theoretical model of foreign aid to analyze a method of disbursement of aid which induces the recipient government to follow a more pro‐poor policy than it otherwise would do. In their two‐period model, aid is given in the second period and the volume of it depends on the level of well‐being of the target group in the first period. They find that this way of designing aid does increase the welfare of the poor. They also consider the situations where the donor and the recipient governments act simultaneously as well as sequentially, and they find that, by moving first in a sequential game, the donor country can, under certain conditions, increase the welfare of the poor and that of its own country compared to the case of simultaneous moves.

Suggested Citation

  • Tejashree Sayanak & Sajal Lahiri, 2009. "Foreign Aid as Prize: Incentives for a Pro‐Poor Policy," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 403-415, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:13:y:2009:i:3:p:403-415
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2009.00498.x
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