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Local Non-Bossiness and Preferences Over Colleagues

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  • Eduardo Duque
  • Juan S. Pereyra
  • Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Abstract

The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is both stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a student can change the schools of others without changing her own. We show that this drawback is limited: a student cannot change her classmates without modifying her school. We refer to this new property as local non-bossiness. Along with strategy-proofness, it ensures a local notion of group strategy-proofness in which manipulating coalitions are restricted to students in the same school. Furthermore, local non-bossiness plays a crucial role in incentives when students have preferences over their colleagues. As long as students first consider the school to which they are assigned and then their classmates, DA induces the only stable and strategy-proof mechanism in this preference domain. To some extent, this is the maximal domain in which a stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists for any school choice context.

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Duque & Juan S. Pereyra & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2024. "Local Non-Bossiness and Preferences Over Colleagues," Working Papers wp559, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp559
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