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On The "Group Non-bossiness" Property

Author

Listed:
  • Mustafa Oguz Afacan

    (Stanford University & Sabanci University)

Abstract

We extend the concept of non-bossiness to groups of agents and say that a mechanism is group non-bossy if no group of agents can change the assignment of someone else while theirs being unaffected by misreporting their preferences. First, we show that they are not equivalent properties. We, then, prove that group strategy-proofness is sufficient for group non-bossiness. While this result implies that the top trading cycles mechanism is group non-bossy, it also provides a characterization of the market structures in which the deferred acceptance algorithm is group non-bossy.

Suggested Citation

  • Mustafa Oguz Afacan, 2012. "On The "Group Non-bossiness" Property," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1571-1575.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00321
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2012/Volume32/EB-12-V32-I2-P151.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
    2. Taisuke Matsubae, 2010. "Impossibility of Stable and Non-damaging bossy Matching Mechanism," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(3), pages 2092-2096.
    3. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
    4. Kojima, Fuhito, 2010. "Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 69-70, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. William Thomson, 2016. "Non-bossiness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 665-696, October.
    2. Eduardo Duque & Juan S. Pereyra & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2024. "Local Non-Bossiness and Preferences Over Colleagues," Working Papers wp559, University of Chile, Department of Economics.

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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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