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Report NEP-DES-2024-06-17
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Danilo Coelho & Salvador Barberà , 2024, "Mechanisms to Appoint Arbitrator Panels or Sets of Judges by Compromise Between Concerned Parties," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1442, May.
- Nicole Immorlica & Nicholas Wu & Brendan Lucier, 2024, "Maximal Procurement under a Budget," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2404.15531, Apr.
- Alfred Galichon & Antoine Jacquet, 2024, "Substitutability, equilibrium transport, and matching models," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2405.07628, May.
- Agustin G. Bonifacio & Nadia Gui~nazu & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2024, "Counting steps for re-stabilization in a labor matching market," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2405.07084, May.
- Eduardo Duque & Juan S. Pereyra & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2024, "Local Non-Bossiness and Preferences Over Colleagues," Working Papers, University of Chile, Department of Economics, number wp559, Jul.
- Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2024, "Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 504, May.
- Yuya Wakabayashi & Ryosuke Sakai & Hiroki Shinozaki, 2024, "Strategy-proof allocation problem with hard budget constraints and income effects: weak efficiency and fairness," OSIPP Discussion Paper, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, number 24E003, May.
- Marinho Bertanha & Margaux Luflade & Ismael Mourifié, 2024, "Causal Effects in Matching Mechanisms with Strategically Reported Preferences," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32434, May.
- Mihir Bhattacharya & Ojasvi Khare, 2024, "Fair allocation with (semi-single-peaked) preferences over location and quantity," Working Papers, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, number 111, Apr.
- Mihir Bhattacharya & Ojasvi Khare, 2023, "Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains," Working Papers, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, number 89, Mar, revised 09 Aug 2023.
- Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Palma, Marco & Feldman, Paul, 2024, "Incentives and Payment Mechanisms in Preference Elicitation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120898, May.
- Cowgill, Bo & Davis, Jonathan & Montagnes, B. Pablo & Perkowski, Patryk, 2024, "Stable Matching on the Job? Theory and Evidence on Internal Talent Markets," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 16986, May.
- Ingrid Huitfeldt & Victoria Marone & Daniel C. Waldinger, 2024, "Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32458, May.
- Abdoulaye Ndiaye, 2024, "Blockchain Price vs. Quantity Controls," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2405.00235, Apr.