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How does group identification affect redistribution in representative democracies? An Experiment

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  • Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap
  • Emma Manifold
  • Konstantinos Matakos
  • Dimitrios Xefteris

Abstract

We test in the laboratory four mechanisms whereby group identification might affect redistribution in representative democracies. For voters, group identification can give rise to a preference for own-group payoffs, for electing an own-group candidate, and could be used to assess candidate-sincerity. For candidates, identity might affect the optimal campaign platform. There is evidence to support all four. The influence of own-group pay-offs has been studied before, but the other mechanisms have not. These new mechanisms combine to make redistribution depend on a hitherto unrecognized factor: the political representation of the minority group.

Suggested Citation

  • Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap & Emma Manifold & Konstantinos Matakos & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2022. "How does group identification affect redistribution in representative democracies? An Experiment," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 02-2022, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucy:cypeua:02-2022
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    Cited by:

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    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

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