An impure public good model with lotteries in large grou
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- Cabrales Goitia, Antonio & Lugo, Haydeé, 2011. "An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1107, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Lugo, Haydée, 2011. "An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups," CEPR Discussion Papers 8319, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Gallier, Carlo & Reif, Christiane & Römer, Daniel, 2014. "Consistent or balanced? On the dynamics of voluntary contributions," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-060, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
More about this item
KeywordsLotteries; Public good; Warm glow; Eficiency.;
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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