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An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups

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Abstract

We analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield first-best levels.

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  • Lugo, Haydée, 2011. "An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups," CEPR Discussion Papers 8319, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8319
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    Cited by:

    1. Gallier, Carlo & Reif, Christiane & Römer, Daniel, 2014. "Consistent or balanced? On the dynamics of voluntary contributions," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-060, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Efficiency; Lotteries; Public good; Warm glow;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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