Incentive Design and Manager Performances: an ABM Approach
We present a simplified model to provide a virtual laboratory to test the effects of the use of different performance evaluation measures to design manager's incentives in a project-based professional service organization. Our company's owner has to cope with the scheduling of multiple resource constraint projects in real time (RCMPSP), and with the design of the production manager incentive, whose variable wage is tied to some measures of the performance, which are proxies of the original owner's goal. We propose an agent based model approach where the agents' intelligence lies in the choice of the scheduling sequences. A discrete event simulator (DES) executes the projects, allocating in real time, the limited resources available. A Genetic Algorithm, evolving the sequence, randomly generated, uses the DES to simulate the effect and ranks the solutions. In this way, we investigate the incentive alignment problem as a resource allocation problem, comparing the results deriving from their respective "good solutions".
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- Myong-Hun Chang & Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2004.
"Agent-Based Models of Organizations,"
Economics Working Paper Archive
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- Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
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Oxford University Press,
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- Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, J. David, 2001. "An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780199243259, December.
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