Optimal Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Humanitarian Assistance during and International Health Emergency
We analyze policy options during an international health emergency to provide consumers in least developed countries access to patented life-extending pharmaceuticals. We show that a properly specified tariff against reexports achieves optimal price dispersion and is shown to depend on the nature of demand, product development costs and humanitarian concerns by western citizens for patients inside a health emergency zone. A tariff dominates regional exhaustion for achieving optimal price dispersion, improves the efficiency properties of a patent for covering product development cost and is a more efficient tool for internalizing a humanitarian externality than a targeted consumption subsidy.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Medford, MA 02155, USA|
Phone: (617) 627-3560
Fax: (617) 627-3917
Web page: http://ase.tufts.edu/economics
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Malueg, D.A. & Schwartz, M., 1993.
"Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion and International Price Discrimination,"
93-6, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
- Malueg, David A. & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Parallel imports, demand dispersion, and international price discrimination," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3-4), pages 167-195, November.
- Keith E. Maskus, 1993. "Intellectual property rights and the Uruguay Round," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q I, pages 10-25.
- Deardorff, Alan V, 1992. "Welfare Effects of Global Patent Protection," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(233), pages 35-51, February.
- Patricia Danzon, 1997. "Price Discrimination for Pharmaceuticals: Welfare Effects in the US and the EU," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 301-322.
- Richardson, Martin, 2002. "An elementary proposition concerning parallel imports," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 233-245, January.
- Varian, Hal R., 1989. "Price discrimination," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 597-654 Elsevier.
- Schmalensee, Richard, 1981.
"Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 71(1), pages 242-47, March.
- Schmalensee, Richard., 1980. "Output and welfare implications of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination," Working papers 1095-80., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Varian, Hal R, 1985. "Price Discrimination and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 870-75, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0416. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Kalogeropoulos)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.