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Who supplies liquidity, how and when?

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  • Biais, Bruno
  • Declerck, Fany
  • Moinas, Sophie

Abstract

Who provides liquidity in modern, electronic limit order book, markets? While agency trading can be constrained by conflicts of interest and information asymmetry between customers and traders, prop traders are likely to be less constrained and thus better positioned to carry inventory risk. Moreover, while slow traders'limit orders may be exposed to severe adverse selection, fast trading technology can improve traders'ability to monitor the market and avoid being picked off. To shed light on these points, we rely on unique data from Euronext and the AMF enabling us to observe the connectivity of traders to the market, and whether they are proprietary traders. We find that proprietary traders, be they fast or slow, provide liquidity with contrarian marketable orders, thus helping the market absorb shocks, even during crisis, and earn profits doing so. Moreover, fast traders provide liquidity by leaving limit orders in the book. Yet, only prop traders can do so without making losses. This suggests that technology is not enough to overcome adverse selection, monitoring incentives are also needed.

Suggested Citation

  • Biais, Bruno & Declerck, Fany & Moinas, Sophie, 2017. "Who supplies liquidity, how and when?," TSE Working Papers 17-818, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:31768
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Cespa & Xavier Vives, 2016. "High Frequency Trading and Fragility," CESifo Working Paper Series 6279, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Fany Declerck & Laurence Lescourret, 2015. "Dark pools et trading haute fréquence : une évolution utile ?," Revue d'économie financière, Association d'économie financière, vol. 0(4), pages 113-126.
    3. Esen Onur & John S. Roberts & Tugkan Tuzun, 2017. "Trader Positions and Marketwide Liquidity Demand," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-103, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Hautsch, Nikolaus & Noé, Michael & Zhang, S. Sarah, 2017. "The ambivalent role of high-frequency trading in turbulent market periods," CFS Working Paper Series 580, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    5. Bellia, Mario & Pelizzon, Loriana & Subrahmanyam, Marti & Uno, Jun & Yuferova, Darya, 2017. "Coming early to the party," SAFE Working Paper Series 182, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
    6. Charles-Albert Lehalle & Othmane Mounjid, 2016. "Limit Order Strategic Placement with Adverse Selection Risk and the Role of Latency," Papers 1610.00261, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2018.
    7. Declerck, F., 2016. "High-frequency trading, geographical concerns and the curvature of the Earth," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 20, pages 153-160, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Liquidity; high-frequency trading; proprietary trading; adverse selection; electronic limit order book; short-term momentum; contrarian;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets

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