An Estimable Dynamic Model of Entry, Exit and Growth in Oligopoly Retail Markets
This paper presents an estimable dynamic structural model of an oligopoly retail industry. The model can be estimated using panel data of local retail markets with information on new entries, exits and the size and growth of incumbent firms. In our model, retail firms are vertically and horizontally differentiated, compete in prices, make investments to improve the quality of their businesses, and decide to exit or to continue in the market. The model extends in two important ways the entry-exit model estimated in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). First, it includes firm size and growth as endogenous variables. And second, the empirical model has two sources of permanent unobserved heterogeneity: local-market heterogeneity and firm heterogeneity. This allows the researcher to control for potentially important sources of bias when using firm panel data with many local markets and several time periods.
|Date of creation:||02 Jan 2007|
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- Ariel Pakes & Michael Ostrovsky & Steven Berry, 2007.
"Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples),"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 373-399, 06.
- Ariel Pakes & Michael Ostrovsky & Steve Berry, 2004. "Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Samples)," NBER Working Papers 10506, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ariel Pakes & Michael Ostrovsky & Steve Berry, 2004. "Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Examples)," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2036, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Patrick Bajari & C. Lanier Benkard & Jonathan Levin, 2004.
"Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition,"
NBER Working Papers
10450, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Patrick Bajari & C. Lanier Benkard & Jonathan Levin, 2007. "Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(5), pages 1331-1370, 09.
- J. Levin & P. Bajari, 2004. "Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition," 2004 Meeting Papers 579, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Bajari, Patrick & Benkard, C. Lanier & Levin, Jonathan, 2007. "Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition," Research Papers 1852r1, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Jonathan Levin (Stanford University) & Pat Bajari & Lanier Benkard, 2004. "Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 627, Econometric Society.
- Victor Aguirregabiria & Pedro Mira, 2004.
"Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games,"
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