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Farsighted Stable Sets of Tariff Games

  • Ryo Kawasaki
  • Takashi Sato
  • Shigeo Muto
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    This article analyzes the tariff negotiation game between two countries when the countries are sufficiently farsighted. It extends the research of Nakanishi (2000) and Oladi (2005) for the tariff retaliation game in which countries take into account subsequence retaliations that may occur after their own retaliation. We show that when countries are sufficiently farsighted, all farsighted stable sets of the tariff game are singletons, which are Pareto efficient and strictly individually rational tariff profiles. These results hold regardless of whether coalitional deviations are allowed or not.

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10097/55410
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    File URL: http://ir.library.tohoku.ac.jp/re/bitstream/10097/55410/1/terg281.pdf
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    Paper provided by Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University in its series TERG Discussion Papers with number 281.

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    Length: 18 pages
    Date of creation: Apr 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:toh:tergaa:281
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Kawauchi, Aoba-ku, Sendai 980-8476
    Web page: http://www.econ.tohoku.ac.jp/econ/english/index.html
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    1. Noritsugu Nakanishi, 2009. "Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an n-player prisoners’ dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 249-261, June.
    2. Reza Oladi, 2005. "Stable Tariffs and Retaliations," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 205-215, 05.
    3. Nakanishi, Noritsugu, 1999. "Reexamination of the International Export Quota Game through the Theory of Social Situations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 132-152, April.
    4. Shino, Junnosuke & Kawasaki, Ryo, 2012. "Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling’s location games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 23-30.
    5. Akihiro Suzuki & Shigeo Muto, 2005. "Farsighted Stability in an n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 431-445, 09.
    6. Tower, Edward, 1975. "The Optimum Quota and Retaliation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 623-30, October.
    7. Masuda, Takeshi, 2002. "Farsighted stability in average return games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 169-181, November.
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