Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an n-player prisoners’ dilemma
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References listed on IDEAS
- Muto, S., 1993. "Alternating-move preplays and vN - M stable sets in two person strategic form games," Discussion Paper 1993-71, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-554, May.
- Kalai, Ehud, 1981. "Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 375-379, August.
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- Ryo Kawasaki & Takashi Sato & Shigeo Muto, 2012. "Farsighted Stable Sets of Tariff Games," TERG Discussion Papers 281, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
- repec:nea:journl:y:2017:i:34:p:181-189 is not listed on IDEAS
- Shino, Junnosuke & Kawasaki, Ryo, 2012.
"Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling’s location games,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, pages 23-30.
- Junnosuke Shino, 2008. "Farsighted Stable Sets in Hotelling's Location Games," Departmental Working Papers 200808, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Yoshio Kamijo, 2013. "Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 339-357.
- Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios Sartzetakis, 2015. "International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 527-546.
- repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0527-9 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kawasaki, Ryo & Sato, Takashi & Muto, Shigeo, 2015. "Farsightedly stable tariffs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 118-124.
- Marina S. Sandomirskaia, 2015. "Price-Quantity Competition of Farsighted Firms: Toughness vs. Collusion," HSE Working papers WP BRP 93/EC/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsPrisoners’ dilemma; Farsighted stability; Theory of social situations (TOSS); Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set;
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