Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
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- Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005.
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- Masuda, Takehito & Okano, Yoshitaka & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2014.
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- Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2013. "The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally," ISER Discussion Paper 08874r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Sep 2013.
- Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Yoshitaka Okano & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2015. "The approval mechanism solves the prisoner's dilemma theoretically and experimentally," Working Papers SDES-2015-12, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Feb 2015.
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- Santos, Vasco, 2000. "Alternating-announcements cheap talk," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 405-416, July.
- Matsui, Akihiko, 1989. "Information leakage forces cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 94-115, March.
- Valentin Goranko & Paolo Turrini, 2016. "Two-Player Preplay Negotiation Games with Conditional Offers," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(01), pages 1-31, March.
- Ehud Kalai, 1981. "Contracts, Consensus, and Group Decisions," Discussion Papers 479, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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- Noritsugu Nakanishi, 2009. "Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an n-player prisoners’ dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 249-261, June.
- Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, "undated". "Approval Mechanism to Solve Prisonerâ€™s Dilemma: Comparison with Varianâ€™s Compensation Mechanism," Working Papers SDES-2016-15, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management.
- Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2010. "A commitment folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 127-137, May.
- Nakajima, Tetsuya, 2014. "Giving a Second Chance to a Disadvantaged Player Resolves the Prisoner’s Dilemma," MPRA Paper 59937, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Xiaochuan Huang & Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2014.
"Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions,"
SDES-2014-7, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Feb 2015.
- Xiaochuan Huang & Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2016. "Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay of leave decisions," KIER Working Papers 944, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
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