Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
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- Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005.
"Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 543-566.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Microeconomics 0211008, EconWPA.
- Wilkie, Simon & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Working Papers 1150, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Masuda, Takehito & Okano, Yoshitaka & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2014. "The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 73-85.
- Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2013. "The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally," ISER Discussion Paper 08874r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Sep 2013.
- Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Yoshitaka Okano & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2015. "The approval mechanism solves the prisoner's dilemma theoretically and experimentally," Working Papers SDES-2015-12, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Feb 2015.
- repec:dpr:wpaper:0874 is not listed on IDEAS
- Santos, Vasco, 2000. "Alternating-announcements cheap talk," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 405-416, July.
- Matsui, Akihiko, 1989. "Information leakage forces cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 94-115, March.
- Akihiko Matsui, 1988. "Information Leakage Forces Cooperation," Discussion Papers 786, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ehud Kalai, 1981. "Contracts, Consensus, and Group Decisions," Discussion Papers 479, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- repec:dpr:wpaper:0874r is not listed on IDEAS
- Noritsugu Nakanishi, 2009. "Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an n-player prisoners’ dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 249-261, June.
- Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2016. "Approval mechanism to solve prisoner's dilemma: Comparison with Varian's compensation mechanism," Working Papers SDES-2016-15, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Nov 2016.
- Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2010. "A commitment folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 127-137, May.
- Nakajima, Tetsuya, 2014. "Giving a Second Chance to a Disadvantaged Player Resolves the Prisoner’s Dilemma," MPRA Paper 59937, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Xiaochuan Huang & Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2014. "Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions," Working Papers SDES-2014-7, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Feb 2015.
- Xiaochuan Huang & Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2016. "Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay of leave decisions," KIER Working Papers 944, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
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