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The potential cost of a failed Doha Round:

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  • Bouet, Antoine
  • Laborde, David

Abstract

"In times of economic turmoil, countries might decide to increase current tariff rates to protect domestic industries or raise revenues in order to finance domestic programs. Using the highest applied or bound rate imposed by countries from 1995 to 2008 as an indicator, this study presents several scenarios regarding the economic costs of a failed Doha Round and a subsequent rush into protectionism. For example, in a scenario where the applied tariffs of major economies would go all the way up to currently bound tariff rates, world trade would decrease by 7.7 percent. In a more modest scenario where countries would raise tariffs to maximum rates applied during the past 13 years, world trade would decrease by 3.2 percent. These increases in duties would reduce world welfare by US$353 billion under the first scenario, and by US$134 billion under the more modest scenario. While such an increase in duties would particularly impact agricultural exports (–6.9 percent), especially in developing countries (–11.5 percent), exports of industrial goods could also face a substantial reduction: 2 percent in developed countries and 4.8 percent in developing countries. This study concludes there would be a potential loss of US$1,064 billion in world trade if world leaders were to fail to conclude the Doha Development Round of trade negotiations in the next few weeks and if countries were to implement subsequently protectionist policies, as occurred after the end of the Uruguay Round. The failure of the negotiations would prevent a US$336 billion increase in world trade that would have come from a reduction in tariffs and domestic support, while a worldwide resort to protectionism would contract world trade by US$728 billion." from text

Suggested Citation

  • Bouet, Antoine & Laborde, David, 2008. "The potential cost of a failed Doha Round:," Issue briefs 56, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  • Handle: RePEc:fpr:issbrf:56
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bouet, Antoine & Decreux, Yvan & Fontagne, Lionel & Jean, Sebastien & Laborde, David, 2005. "A Consistent Picture of Applied Protection Across the World," Working Papers 18859, TRADEAG - Agricultural Trade Agreements.
    2. Sébastien Jean & David Laborde & Will Martin, 2008. "Choosing Sensitive Agricultural Products in Trade Negotiations," Working Papers 2008-18, CEPII research center.
    3. Edward Tower, 1975. "The Optimum Quota and Retaliation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(4), pages 623-630.
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    5. Will Martin & Patrick Messerlin, 2007. "Why is it so difficult? Trade liberalization under the Doha Agenda," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 347-366, Autumn.
    6. Houssein Guimbard & David Laborde Debucquet & Cristina Mitaritonna, 2009. "A Picture of Tariff Protection Across the World in 2004 MAcMap-HS6, Version 2," Working Papers 2009-22, CEPII research center.
    7. Jakob B. Madsen, 2001. "Trade Barriers and the Collapse of World Trade During the Great Depression," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 67(4), pages 848-868, April.
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    9. Yvan Decreux & Hugo Valin, 2007. "MIRAGE, Updated Version of the Model for Trade Policy Analysis: Focus on Agriculture and Dynamics," Working Papers 2007-15, CEPII research center.
    10. Antoine Bouët & Simon Mevel & David Orden, 2007. "More or Less Ambition in the Doha Round: Winners and Losers from Trade Liberalisation with a Development Perspective," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(8), pages 1253-1280, August.
    11. Berisha-Krasniqi, Valdete & Bouet, Antoine & Laborde, David & Mevel, Simon, 2008. "The development promise: Can the doha development agenda deliver for least developed countries?," Research briefs 14, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Willenbockel, Dirk, 2009. "From overhang to hangover: consequences of protectionist responses to the global crisis for low-income countries," MPRA Paper 16100, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Gouel, Christophe & Mitaritonna, Cristina & Ramos, Maria Priscila, 2011. "Sensitive products in the Doha negotiations: The case of European and Japanese market access," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 2395-2403.
    3. Hoekman, Bernard & Martin, Will & Mattoo, Aaditya, 2010. "Conclude Doha: it matters!," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(03), pages 505-530, July.
    4. Patrick Messerlin & Erik Van Der Marel, 2009. "'Leading with Services': The Dynamics of Transatlantic Negotiations in Services," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5l6uh8ogmqi, Sciences Po.
    5. Sebastian Saez, 2009. "Managing Trade Policy During the Economic Crisis," World Bank Other Operational Studies 11113, The World Bank.
    6. Popa, Diana, 2011. "Runda Doha: început fără sfârşit
      [Doha Round: the endless beginning]
      ," MPRA Paper 28764, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Feb 2011.
    7. Yvan Decreux & Lionel Fontagné, 2011. "Economic Impact of Potential Outcome of the DDA," Working Papers 2011-23, CEPII research center.
    8. Antoine Bouët & David Laborde, 2010. "Why is the Doha Development Agenda Failing? And What Can Be Done? A Computable General Equilibrium–Game Theoretical Approach," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(11), pages 1486-1516, November.
    9. Shamim Shakur & Allan N Rae, 2012. "The impact of comprehensive tariff reductions in multilateral trade: further results from computable general equilibrium simulations," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 182-189.
    10. Patrick A. Messerlin, 2011. "World trade regime, World Trade Organization and large-schale crises," STUDIES IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT,in: Trade-led growth: A sound strategy for Asia, chapter 2 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).
    11. Diana Popa, 2012. "The Collapse of the Doha Round and a Possible Completion of Negotiations," Romanian Economic Journal, Department of International Business and Economics from the Academy of Economic Studies Bucharest, vol. 15(43), pages 165-188, March.
    12. Wolfe, Robert, 2010. "Endogenous Learning and Consensual Understanding in Multilateral Negotiations: Arguing and Bargaining in the WTO," Working Papers 90885, Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy Research Network.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agricultural policies; WTO Doha round; International trade; exports; tariffs; Protectionism;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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