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Regret Equilibria in Games

Author

Listed:
  • Droste, E.J.R.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Kosfeld, M.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Voorneveld, M.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Droste, E.J.R. & Kosfeld, M. & Voorneveld, M., 1998. "Regret Equilibria in Games," Discussion Paper 1998-19, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:a1c6818c-ae66-4fa0-82a8-f29d0087c2e5
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading To Correlated Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 2, pages 17-46, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    3. Ariel Rubinstein, 1997. "Modeling Bounded Rationality," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262681005, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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