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Diagnosing Foreclosure Due to Exclusive Dealing

  • John Asker

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File URL: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jasker/Paper1_ExclusiveForeclosure.pdf
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Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 04-36.

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Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:04-36
Contact details of provider: Postal: New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012-1126
Phone: (212) 998-0860
Fax: (212) 995-4218
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/

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  1. Rebecca Hellerstein, 2006. "A decomposition of the sources of incomplete cross-border transmission," Staff Reports 250, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  2. Comanor, William S & Frech, H E, III, 1985. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 539-46, June.
  3. Aviv Nevo, 2003. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," Microeconomics 0303006, EconWPA.
  4. Bonnet, Céline & Dubois, Pierre & Simioni, Michel, 2006. "Two-Part Tariffs versus Linear Pricing Between Manufacturers and Retailers: Empirical Tests on Differentiated Products Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 6016, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, . "Exclusive Dealing," Working Papers 96008, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  6. Tasneem Chipty, 2001. "Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 428-453, June.
  7. Julie Holland Mortimer, 2002. "The Effects of Revenue-Sharing Contracts on Welfare in Vertically-Separated Markets: Evidence from the Video Rental Industry," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1964, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  8. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-71, May.
  9. Patton Culbertson, W. & Bradford, David, 1991. "The price of beer: Some evidence from interstate comparisons," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 275-289, June.
  10. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2000. "Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 603-633, Winter.
  11. Klein, Benjamin & Murphy, Kevin M, 1988. "Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 265-97, October.
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