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The Impact of Liner Shipping Trade and Competition Regulations on The Market Structure, Maritime Transport Costs and Seaborne Trade Flows: Regulations on The Market Structure, Maritime Transport Costs and Seaborne Trade Flows

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  • Fabien Bertho

    (Sciences Po)

Abstract

J’évalue l’impact des réglementations commerciales et concurrentielles dans transport maritime de ligne sur la structure du marché, les coûts de transport et le commerce maritime. D’abord, je quantifie le niveau global des Barrières Commerciales (BC) dans le secteur du transport maritime de ligne en construisant un Indice de Restriction du Commerce des Services (IRCS). Cet indicateur est inclus dans une analyse économétrique en deux étapes. Les BC sont susceptibles d’influencer le commerce maritime à travers les Coûts de Transport Maritime (CTM). Ainsi, j’évalue l'impact des BC sur les CTM, puis l'impact des CTM sur le commerce maritime. Je montre que les BC ont un impact positif sur les CTM et que les CTM ont un impact négatif sur le commerce maritime. Ainsi, les BC ont un impact indirect négatif sur le commerce maritime. Je montre aussi qu’en plus d’affecter négativement le commerce maritime à travers les CTM, la distance a un impact positif direct sur le commerce maritime. Ensuite, j’évalue l'impact des barrières réglementaires à l'entrée sur la structure du marché et les CTM. D’abord, j’évalue l'impact de la réglementation sur la structure du marché. Puis, j’évalue l'impact de la structure du marché sur les CTM. Je montre que la présence de conférences maritimes n’a pas d’impact sur le nombre de compagnies sur les routes alors que la présence d'accords de discussion a un impact positif. De plus, lorsqu’elles atteignent un seuil, les BC ont un impact négatif sur le nombre de compagnies. En outre, je montre les BC affectent les CTM à travers la structure du marché et les coûts marginaux. Enfin, je montre que les compagnies maritimes de ligne exercent un pouvoir de march

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  • Fabien Bertho, 2012. "The Impact of Liner Shipping Trade and Competition Regulations on The Market Structure, Maritime Transport Costs and Seaborne Trade Flows: Regulations on The Market Structure, Maritime Transport Costs," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6, Sciences Po.
  • Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09mit038srm
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    Keywords

    Transport maritime; service; Coûts de transport; indicateur; commerce; réglementations; concurrence;
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