Reputation and Pricing on the e-Market: Evidence from a Major French Platform
We use an exhaustive data set from one of France's largest e-commerce platforms, PriceMinister.com, to estimate a statistical causal effect of a seller's reputation (and size) on transaction prices for a large range of product categories (books, CDs, video games or DVDs), product conditions (used or new) and seller types (individual or professional sellers). We go beyond the results currently available by tackling the issue of seller unobserved heterogeneity and the dynamics of reputation (and size) in price equations. Our results show large-scale empirical evidence of a significant, positive and strong effect of seller reputation on prices.
|Date of creation:||May 2014|
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- Tobias J. Klein & Christian Lambertz & Konrad O. Stahl, 2016.
"Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(6), pages 1677-1713.
- Klein, Tobias J. & Lambertz, Christian & Stahl, Konrad O., 2013. "Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 426, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Klein, Tobias J. & Lambertz, Christian & Stahl, Konrad, 2014. "Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard," Working Papers 14-25, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
- Tobias J. Klein & Christian Lambertz & Konrad O. Stahl, 2013. "Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard," CESifo Working Paper Series 4552, CESifo Group Munich.
- Andrew Atkeson & Christian Hellwig & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2015. "Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 130(1), pages 415-464.
- Guillermo Ordonez & Andrew Atkeson, 2009. "Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns," 2009 Meeting Papers 830, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Andrew Atkeson & Christian Hellwig & Guillermo L. Ordonez, 2012. "Optimal regulation in the presence of reputation concerns," Staff Report 464, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Atkeson, Andrew & Hellwig, Christian & Ordoñez, Guillermo, 2014. "Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns," CEPR Discussion Papers 10080, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andrew Atkeson & Christian Hellwig & Guillermo Ordonez, 2012. "Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns," NBER Working Papers 17898, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bruno Jullien & In-Uck Park, 2009. "Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000330, David K. Levine.
- Bruno Jullien & In-Uck Park, 2011. "Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 11/272, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Michael Anderson & Jeremy Magruder, 2012. "Learning from the Crowd: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effects of an Online Review Database," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(563), pages 957-989, 09.
- Jeffrey A. Livingston, 2005. "How Valuable Is a Good Reputation? A Sample Selection Model of Internet Auctions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 453-465, August. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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