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Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem

  • Hervé Crès
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    In a simple parametric general equilibrium model with S states of nature and K · S ¯rms |and thus potentially incomplete markets|, rates of super majority rule ½ 2 [0; 1] are computed which guarantee the existence of ½{majority stable production equilibria: within each ¯rm, no alternative production plan can rally a proportion bigger than ½ of the shareholders, or shares (depending on the governance), against the equilibrium. Under some assumptions of concavity on the distributions of agents' types, the smallest ½ are shown to obtain for announced production plans whose span contains the ideal securities of all K mean shareholders. These rates of super majority are always smaller than Caplin and Nalebu® (1988, 1991) bound of 1¡1=e ¼ 0:64. Moreover, simple majority production equilibria are shown to exist for any initial distribution of types when K = S ¡1, and for symmetric distributions of types as soon as K ¸ S=2.

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    File URL: http://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/10284/resources/cres-crhec-2000.pdf
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    Paper provided by Sciences Po in its series Sciences Po publications with number 706/2000.

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    Date of creation: Jul 2000
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    Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/10284
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    1. John Geanakoplos & Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii & J. Dreze, 1988. "Generic Inefficiency of Stock Market Equilibrium When Markets Are Incomplete," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 863, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Hervé, CRES & Mich, TVEDE, 1998. "Ordering Pareto-Optima Through Majority Voting," Les Cahiers de Recherche 638, HEC Paris.
    3. Egbert DIERKER & Hildegard DIERKER & Birgit GRODAL, 1999. "Incomplete Markets and the Firm," Vienna Economics Papers vie9902, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    4. Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, 1978. "A theory of competitive equilibrium in stock market economies," Special Studies Papers 115, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.
    6. Caplin, A. & Nalebuff, B., 1989. "Aggregation And Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Discussion Papers 1989_31, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
    7. Alessandro Citanna & Antonio Villanacci, 2004. "Pooling and endogenous market incompleteness," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 549-560, October.
    8. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
    9. DeMarzo, Peter M, 1993. "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 713-34, July.
    10. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
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