Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem
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- CRES, Herve, 2000. "Majority stable production equilibria : a multivariate mean shareholders theorem," HEC Research Papers Series 706, HEC Paris.
- Hervé Crès, 2000. "Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem," Working Papers hal-00598173, HAL.
- Hervé Crès, 2000. "Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem," Working Papers hal-01064883, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crés, 2005.
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- Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Working Papers hal-00597193, HAL.
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2001. "Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Working Papers hal-01064884, HAL.
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2004. "Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Discussion Papers 04-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- CRES, Herve & TVEDE, Mich, 2001. "Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets," HEC Research Papers Series 722, HEC Paris.
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2001. "Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Sciences Po publications 722/2001, Sciences Po.
- Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001.
"Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent,"
Sciences Po publications
726/2001, Sciences Po.
- Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Working Papers hal-01065004, HAL.
- CRES, Herve & TVEDE, Mich, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," HEC Research Papers Series 726, HEC Paris.
- Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Working Papers hal-00597200, HAL.
- Beker, Pablo F., 2007.
"Market Selection And Payout Policy Under Majority Rule,"
Economic Research Papers
269763, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Beker, Pablo F, 2007. "Market Selection and Payout Policy Under Majority Rule," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 814, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
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