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On the inverse relationship between ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard: the case of smokers

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  • Guido Citoni

Abstract

In the paper I start from the observation that smokers' use of services is less than expected and I suggest that this finding is coherent with an hypothesis: there is a psychological component, leading to increased/reduced consumption if the illness was not/was generated by ex-ante moral hazard.I illustrate the amount and significance of such psychological effect by estimating with Italian survey data, a consumption function for medical consultations and diagnostic screenings, in which smokers represent a group with high ex-ante moral hazard and low ex-post moral hazard, while former smokers have low ex-ante moral hazard and high ex-post moral hazard.The results confirm the theory, though in an asymmetric way: past smokers' consumption shows a strong and significant increase, while current smokers' reduction of use is lower and not always significant.

Suggested Citation

  • Guido Citoni, 2015. "On the inverse relationship between ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard: the case of smokers," Working Papers CEB 15-041, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/218502
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Guido Citoni, 2015. "On equity in health and health care consumption: the role of moral hazard," Working Papers CEB 15-042, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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    Keywords

    smokers; past-smokers; health care consumption; moral hazard;
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