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The law of survival of the political class: an analysis of the Italian Parliament (1946-2010)

  • Silvia Fedeli
  • Francesco Forte
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    Drawing on Alchian‟s and Schumpeter‟s theories about the market selection of entrepreneurs and on theories of the political class, we focus on the features characterizing the Italian post-war democratic Parliament, from 1946 to 2010. We analyse the survival of the members of the Italian Parliament, taking into account all available information concerning their individual characteristics and political affiliation. We apply the stratified Cox model, taking into consideration the order of re-election of the 15,357 repeated observations (representing 7,127 members of the Italian Parliament since 1946), who are followed as if they were “patients†in order to study their parliamentary survival.

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    Paper provided by University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics in its series Working Papers with number 146.

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    Length: 42
    Date of creation: Sep 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp146
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    1. Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo, 2004. "Bad politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 759-782, March.
    2. Michael Wohlgemuth, 2000. "Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 273-295.
    3. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
    4. Timothy Besley, 2005. "Political Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 43-60, Summer.
    5. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
    6. Mario Cleves & William W. Gould & Roberto G. Gutierrez & Yulia Marchenko, 2010. "An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using Stata," Stata Press books, StataCorp LP, edition 3, number saus3, December.
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