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Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly

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  • Michael Wohlgemuth

    () (Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Wirtschaftssystemen, Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany)

Abstract

An analytical framework for dealing with political entrepreneurship and reform is proposed which is based on some new combinations of Schumpeterian political economy, an extended version of Tullock's model of democracy as franchise-bidding for natural monopoly and some basic elements of New Institutional Economics. It is shown that problems of insufficient award criteria and incomplete contracts which may arise in economic bidding schemes, also - and even more so - characterise political competition. At the same time, these conditions create leeway for Schumpeterian political entrepreneurship. The same is true for various barriers to entry in politics. These barriers affect a trade-off between political stability and political contestability which will be discussed with special emphasis on incentives and opportunities for political entrepreneurship in the sense of risking long-term investments in basic political reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Wohlgemuth, 2000. "Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 273-295.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:10:y:2000:i:3:p:273-295
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marianne Van Der Steen & John Groenewegen, 2009. "Policy entrepreneurship: empirical inquiry into policy agents and institutional structures," Journal of Innovation Economics, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 41-61.
    2. Robin Douhan & Magnus Henrekson, 2010. "Entrepreneurship and second-best institutions: going beyond Baumol’s typology," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, pages 629-643.
    3. repec:ris:ecoint:0801 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Douhan, Robin & Henrekson, Magnus, 2007. "The Political Economy of Entrepreneurship: An Introduction," Working Paper Series 688, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    5. Michael Wohlgemuth, 2011. "Is there a Paradox of a Hayekian Paternalist?," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2011-22, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    6. Klein, Peter G. & Mahoney, Joseph T. & McGahan, Anita M. & Pitelis, Christos N., 2009. "Toward a Theory of Public Entrepreneurship," Working Papers 09-0106, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    7. Michael Wohlgemuth, 2002. "Democracy and Opinion Falsification: Towards a New Austrian Political Economy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, pages 223-246.
    8. Pavel Kuchař, 2016. "Entrepreneurship and institutional change," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, pages 349-379.
    9. Klein, Peter G. & Mahoney, Joseph T. & McGahan, Anita M. & Pitelis, Christos N., 2009. "Toward a Theory of Public Entrepreneurship," Working Papers 09-0106, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    10. Trofimov, Ivan, 2017. "Entrepreneurship and policy dynamics: a theoretical framework," MPRA Paper 79497, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Silvia Fedeli & Francesco Forte, 2011. "The law of survival of the political class: an analysis of the Italian Parliament (1946-2010)," Working Papers 146, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Schumpeter and public choice - Political entrepreneurs - Entry barriers - Policy reform - Political competition;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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