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Fair bounds based solidarity


  • Peris, Josep E.

    () (Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica)

  • Jiménez-Gómez, José M.

    () (Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Dep. d'Economia and CREIP)


How should scholarships be distributed among the (public) higher education students? We raise this situation as a redistribution problem. Following the approach developed in Fleurbaey (1994) and Bossert (1995), redistribution should be based on the notion of solidarity and it reallocates resources taking into account only agents' relevant characteristics. We also follow Luttens (2010a), who considers that compensation of relevant characteristics must be based on a lower bound on what every individual deserves. In doing so, we use the so called fair bound (Moulin (2002)) to define an egalitarian redistribution mechanism and characterize it in terms of non-negativity, priority in lower bound and solidarity. Finally, we apply our approach to the scholarships redistribution problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Peris, Josep E. & Jiménez-Gómez, José M., 2012. "Fair bounds based solidarity," QM&ET Working Papers 12-12, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:qmetal:2012_012

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. John E. Roemer, 1986. "Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 751-784.
    2. Moulin, Herve, 2002. "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357 Elsevier.
    3. Hervé MOULIN, 1994. "La présence d’envie comment s’en accomoder?," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1994013, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    4. Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2006. "Compensation and responsibility," Working Papers halshs-00121367, HAL.
    5. Roland Luttens, 2010. "Minimal rights based solidarity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(1), pages 47-64, January.
    6. Johnstone, D. Bruce, 2004. "The economics and politics of cost sharing in higher education: comparative perspectives," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 403-410, August.
    7. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    8. Carmen Herrero & Antonio Villar, 2002. "Sustainability in bankruptcy problems," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 10(2), pages 261-273, December.
    9. José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & M. Marco-Gil, 2014. "A new approach for bounding awards in bankruptcy problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 447-469, August.
    10. Diego Dominguez, 2007. "Lower bounds and recursive methods for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims," Working Papers 0705, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    11. Thomson, William, 1988. "A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 237-254, December.
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    More about this item


    Redistribution mechanism; Lower bounds; Scholarship; Solidarity;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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