IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed012/182.html

Moral hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents

Author

Listed:
  • Roger Myerson

    (University of Chicago)

Abstract

We consider a simple overlapping-generations model with risk-averse financial agents subject to moral hazard. Efficient contracts for such financial intermediaries involve back-loaded late-career rewards. Compared to the analogous model with risk-neutral agents, risk aversion tends to reduce the growth of agents' responsibilities over their careers. This moderation of career growth rates can reduce the amplitude of the widest credit cycles, but it also can cause small deviations from steady state to amplify over time in rational-expectations equilibria. We find equilibria in which fluctuations increase until the economy enters a boom/bust cycle where no financial agents are hired in booms.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger Myerson, 2012. "Moral hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents," 2012 Meeting Papers 182, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed012:182
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2012/paper_182.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Kikuchi, Tomoo & Stachurski, John & Vachadze, George, 2018. "Volatile capital flows and financial integration: The role of moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 170-192.
    3. Hashimoto, Ken-ichi & Im, Ryonghun & Kunieda, Takuma & Shibata, Akihisa, 2022. "Financial destabilization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    4. Takao Asano & Masanori Yokoo, 2017. "Chaotic Dynamics of a Piecewise Linear Model of Credit Cycles with Imperfect Observability," KIER Working Papers 967, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    5. Matsuyama, Kiminori & Sushko, Iryna & Gardini, Laura, 2016. "Revisiting the model of credit cycles with Good and Bad projects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 525-556.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E10 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - General
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed012:182. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christian Zimmermann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sedddea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.