Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents
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- Roger Myerson, 2012. "Moral hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents," 2012 Meeting Papers 182, Society for Economic Dynamics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Roger B. Myerson, 2012. "A Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 847-878.
- Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
- Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Matsuyama, Kiminori & Sushko, Iryna & Gardini, Laura, 2016.
"Revisiting the model of credit cycles with Good and Bad projects,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 525-556.
- Kiminori Matsuyama & Iryna Sushko & Laura Gardini, 2015. "Revisiting the Model of Credit Cycles with Good and Bad Projects," IMES Discussion Paper Series 15-E-02, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
- Kiminori Matsuyama & Iryna Sushko & Laura Gardini, 2015. "Revisiting the model of credit cycles with good and bad projects," Gecomplexity Discussion Paper Series 8, Action IS1104 "The EU in the new complex geography of economic systems: models, tools and policy evaluation", revised Feb 2015.
- repec:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:170-192 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsMoral hazard; Credit cycles;
- E10 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - General
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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