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What May Constitute an Equal Society? Addressing Externalities of Globalization:

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  • Mamoon, Dawood

Abstract

This paper is a short review of Mamoon (2007) analysis on inequality where it is contrasted with growth. The economic processes or institutional dynamics that are good for growth may not be a priority if inequalities are the prime consideration. For example rule of law and control for corruption are the most salient factors to mitigate inequality but though they are also good for growth, it is good regulation that takes the lead in growth promotion. China has been benefitting from good market regulation - a pro capitalist economic tool kit while suffering from rising inequality that may be due to less emphasis on control for corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Mamoon, Dawood, 2001. "What May Constitute an Equal Society? Addressing Externalities of Globalization:," MPRA Paper 77335, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:77335
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mamoon, D. & Murshed, S.M., 2005. "Are institutions more important than integration?," ISS Working Papers - General Series 19177, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
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    5. Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth Lee Sokoloff, 2002. "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economies," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2002), pages 41-110, August.
    6. Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 131-165, June.
    7. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2007. "Inequality and Institutions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(3), pages 454-465, August.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inequality; growth; globalization; Institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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