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Структурирование Рынков – Инструмент Государственной Промышленной Политики
[Market structuring as an instrument of the state industrial policy implementation]


  • Kolesnik, Georgiy
  • Shvets, Nicolay


One of the instruments of market competition regulation is the formation of a hierarchical structure of producers by providing some of them with the preferential terms of business. In addition to the changes in market prices, the sale of privileges to producers allows consumer to extract some extra income. The authors study the impact of the privileges in the form of long-term agreements on the market equilibrium and consumer surplus. It is shown that long-term agreements are effective for a consumer at the markets with а small number of participants. The influence of transaction costs on the optimal market contracting structure is analyzed.

Suggested Citation

  • Kolesnik, Georgiy & Shvets, Nicolay, 2014. "Структурирование Рынков – Инструмент Государственной Промышленной Политики
    [Market structuring as an instrument of the state industrial policy implementation]
    ," MPRA Paper 75701, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:75701

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2009. "Preferred suppliers in auction markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 283-295.
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    More about this item


    competition; market; privileges; welfare; hierarchical system; regulation; industrial policy; procurement activity; long-term agreement; import substitution;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation


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