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Структурирование Рынков - Инструмент Государственной Промышленной Политики

Author

Listed:
  • Колесник Г.В.
  • Швец Н.Н.

Abstract

Одним из инструментов регулирования конкуренции является формирование иерархической структуры рынка путем предоставления некоторым его участникам преференциальных условий деятельности. Помимо изменения рыночных цен продажа преференций позволяет потребителю извлекать дополнительный доход, который может принимать неденежную форму. В статье исследовано влияние преференций в форме долгосрочных договоров поставки на рыночные равновесия и благосостояние потребителя. Показано, что заключение таких договоров эффективно для потребителя на рынках с малым числом участников. Исследовано влияние трансакционных издержек на оптимальное для потребителя число заключаемых долгосрочных договоров.

Suggested Citation

  • Колесник Г.В. & Швец Н.Н., 2015. "Структурирование Рынков - Инструмент Государственной Промышленной Политики," Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), vol. 51(4), pages 85-95, октябрь.
  • Handle: RePEc:scn:cememm:v:51:y:2015:i:4:p:85-95
    Note: Москва
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2009. "Preferred suppliers in auction markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 283-295.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    конкуренция; рынок; преференции; благосостояние; иерархическая система; регулирование; промышленная политика; закупочная деятельность; долгосрочный договор; импортозамещение.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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