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Partisanship at the Origins of Modern Capitalist Institutions

  • Carney, Richard
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    Analyses that gauge the relationship of partisanship to economic outcomes nearly always focus on the level of partisanship, and changes to it, at a time concurrent to the outcomes. However, partisanship at the time an institution was established may correspond more strongly to modern economic outcomes than contemporary partisanship measures. To test this argument, I develop a measure of partisanship at the time that modern capitalist institutions were created. Tests reveal that this measure correlates more strongly to many modern economic outcomes than more contemporary measures of partisanship, suggesting that other economic outcomes may be usefully reexamined in light of the partisanship that existed when the initial institutional bargains were struck.

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    File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5147/1/MPRA_paper_5147.pdf
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    Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 5147.

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    Date of creation: 15 Sep 2007
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    Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5147
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    1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1998. "Law and Finance," Scholarly Articles 3451310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Hall, Peter A. & Soskice, David (ed.), 2001. "Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247752, March.
    3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," NBER Working Papers 6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, 2005. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1005-1030, September.
    5. Giuseppe Nicoletti & Stefano Scarpetta & Olivier Boylaud, 2000. "Summary Indicators of Product Market Regulation with an Extension to Employment Protection Legislation," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 226, OECD Publishing.
    6. Hall, Peter A. & Gingerich, Daniel W., 2004. "Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    7. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century," CRSP working papers 526, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    8. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 1999. "A new database on financial development and structure," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2146, The World Bank.
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