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On the Implications of Contract Farming on Agricultural and Rural Development in India : With Special Reference to Karanataka, India

Author

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  • Motkuri, Venkatanarayana
  • Veslawatha, Suresh Naik

Abstract

The present paper examines the rationale for the introduction of contract farming in Indian context and advantages and disadvantages it draws with reference to rural and agricultural development where particular emphasis is given to marginal and small farmers. It is also looking into what are the ideal market conditions necessary for the contract farming to be encouraged and to what extent state can have its regulatory mechanism to monitor and control the contract farming to the extent it benefits the farmers along with sponsoring companies. The study is narrowed down to a case study of Karnataka, which already launched the initiatives towards the contract farming.

Suggested Citation

  • Motkuri, Venkatanarayana & Veslawatha, Suresh Naik, 2005. "On the Implications of Contract Farming on Agricultural and Rural Development in India : With Special Reference to Karanataka, India," MPRA Paper 48443, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:48443
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48443/1/MPRA_paper_48443.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dileep, B.K. & Grover, R.K. & Rai, K.N., 2002. "Contract Farming in Tomato: An Economic Analysis," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, vol. 57(2), June.
    2. Allen, Douglas & Lueck, Dean, 1992. "Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 397-426, October.
    3. Rao, V.M., 1994. "Farmers in Market Economy: Would Farmers Gain through Liberalisation," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, vol. 49(3).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Barik, Prasenjit, 2021. "A critical analysis of India’s Contract Farming Act 2020," Agricultural Economics Research Review, Agricultural Economics Research Association (India), vol. 34(Conferenc), October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agriculture; Contract Farming; India; Karnataka;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q10 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - General
    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • Q16 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - R&D; Agricultural Technology; Biofuels; Agricultural Extension Services
    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy; Animal Welfare Policy

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