Cross-ownership and stability in a Cournot duopoly
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsBifurcation; Cournot; Cross-ownership; Duopoly;
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-11-14 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2011-11-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2011-11-14 (Industrial Organization)
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