Manipulation in oligopoly
The purpose of this paper is to generalize the results obtained by Sklivas (1987) and Fershtman and Judd (1987) allowing for non-linear demand functions, many players and general attitudes to the risk by the players. We also generalize their set-up by introducing a more general measure of th aggresivity of players in the second stage of the game.
|Date of creation:||1994|
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- Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
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