National trade associations, economic development and globalization
In the post communism regime, the responsibility of economic development has largely been shifted to private sector. The increasing role of private sector enterprises introduced the new concepts of corporate social responsibility (CSR), democratization in business and finance, corporate culture, fair trade, good governance and economic freedom and participation. The ‘wealth maximization concept’ under the ‘extreme capitalism’, limited liability, separate entity, agency cost, professionalism, and competitiveness were redefined. The implementation of the separate entity concept and the code of corporate governance have become more important in the post communism regime. Now, problems in trade and investment are closely linked with the problems of unemployment, income distribution, poverty, macroeconomic growth, regional and infrastructure development, socio-cultural changes, political structure, and the rate of crimes in a country. Business related issues couldn’t be studied in isolation; they are integrated with the sociopolitical dimensions of an economy. In the present inclination of globalization where the word ‘countries’ is being silently replaced by ‘economies’, the role of trade bodies has became more important. The policy advocacy, research and to work as a leading and supreme think tank should be the core activities of the national and multilateral chambers of commerce. The power and role of the chambers in global polices has been studied and contemplated by various analysts. The role of trade associations, chambers of commerce, large corporations and the business groups in the economic development has become an important area of research which lead the drastic development in the literature of business economics. Now, Business Economics has become an important branch of the applied economics. To provide a forum for research and debates on the contemporary issues in Business Economics, the National Association of Business Economists are serving in the developing and industrialized countries. These associations have close association with the National Chambers of Commerce. Various economists have been analyzing on the productivity, importance and the role of the local chambers and the trade specific associations. Aldrich, Fiol, and Staber from Cambridge University, Arendt from University of Chicago, Axelrod, from New York, Benhabib from Princeton University, Dowling from Oxford University, Fombrun from Harvard Business School, Fukuyama from John Hopkins University, Gutmann from Harvard University, Harré from Cambridge University, Lehne from New York University, Olson from Harvard University, North from Cambridge University, Olson from Harvard University, and Shapiro from Oxford University are famous research scholars in the filed of business economics who have been serving on the role of large business houses and the business representative associations in the economic and socio political development and changes in the global business and financial environment. The paper covers the importance and background of the study, nexus of the chambers with the states and multilateral institutions and effects on socioeconomic development and policy Recommendations.
|Date of creation:||07 Jul 2008|
|Date of revision:||17 Sep 2008|
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