A Game Theoretical View on Efficiency Wage Theories
The efficiency wage theory developed by Akerlof (1982) assumes observability of effort and the ability of firm and worker to commit on their effort/wage decisions. We show that, from a game theoretical point of view, we have to understand the firm/worker relationship as a repeated Prisoner's dilemma. Therefore, cooperation is per se not a (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium and hence the Akerlof (1982) theory is based upon an implicit assumption of cooperation, which can not be implemented w.l.o.g.. In addition, we find that this approach is a special case of the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) approach and hence unify the two approaches.
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- Jean-Pierre Danthine & André Kurmann, 2003.
"Fair Wages in a New Keynesian Model of the Business Cycle,"
Cahiers de recherche
- Jean-Pierre Danthine & Andre Kurmann, 2004. "Fair Wages in a New Keynesian Model of the Business Cycle," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(1), pages 107-142, January.
- Jean-Pierre DANTHINE & André KURMANN, 2002. "Fair Wages in a New Keynesian Model of the Business Cycle," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 02.10, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Danthine, Jean-Pierre & Kurmann, Andre, 2002. "Fair Wages in a New Keynesian Model of the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 3423, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Thomas Lemieux & W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 2009.
"Performance Pay and Wage Inequality,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 124(1), pages 1-49.
- Thomas Lemieux & W. Bentley Macleod & Daniel Parent, 2006. "Performance Pay And Wage Inequality," Departmental Working Papers 2006-08, McGill University, Department of Economics.
- Thomas Lemieux & W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 2007. "Performance Pay and Wage Inequality," NBER Working Papers 13128, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lemieux, Thomas & MacLeod, W. Bentley & Parent, Daniel, 2007. "Performance Pay and Wage Inequality," IZA Discussion Papers 2850, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- George A. Akerlof, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-569.
- Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
- Danthine, Jean-Pierre & Donaldson, John B., 1990. "Efficiency wages and the business cycle puzzle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(7), pages 1275-1301, November.
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