A game-theoretic systematic of interactions and dynamics in the conservation and management of spatial ecosystem services

Since many ecosystem services involve spatial scales beyond farm size, their preservation and management in agricultural systems depends on the interaction of the landowners. For the analysis of such interactive land use a dynamic generic land-use model is developed that considers different payoff structures in a systematic manner and relates land-use dynamics to payoff structure in a generic manner. A landowner’s own payoff depends on the land use on neighbouring land parcels. The landowners’ payoffs are interpreted in a game-theoretic manner which allows for a game-theoretic classification of the different land-use dynamics generated by the model. The model is analysed to determine the proportion, spatial aggregation and temporal turnover of land-use measures. The model results are applied to a number of cases from the literature in which the management of ecosystem services involves a regional scale, including pollinator conservation, pest control, and coordination incentives for the conservation of species in fragmented landscapes. Four main domains of model behaviour are identified, characterised by the proportions and temporal turnover of land-use measures, and whether the system has one or two stable equilibria. The borders between different domains are characterised by high behaviour-induced spatial aggregation of land-use measures.