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The Evolution of Sectarianism

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  • Ille, Sebastian

Abstract

Human cooperation for reasons other than self-interest has long intrigued social scientists leading to a substantial literature in economics. Its complement –sectarianism – has not received closer attention in economics despite its significant impact. Based on a dynamic model, the paper shows that sectarianism can be understood as the outcome of a repeated bargaining process in which sectarian affiliation evolves into a pure coordination signal that attributes economic and political benefits. It demonstrates that such sectarian social contracts co-evolve with the sects’ degree of coerciveness and are self-reinforcing. Sectarian conflict may then not be a result of diverging religious ideologies but is shown to be caused by external manipulations of the signal (e.g. via identity politics), and internal political and economic grievances within a sect that spill over to the inter-sectarian level while adopting a sectarian appearance. Theoretical results are supported by empirical findings from the Middle East.

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  • Ille, Sebastian, 2021. "The Evolution of Sectarianism," MPRA Paper 106451, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:106451
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Sebastian Ille & Eugenio Vicario, 2022. "Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove game," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(2), pages 333-351, October.
    2. Sanchez-Carrera Edgar J. & Travaglini Giuseppe & Ille Sebastian, 2021. "Macrodynamic Modeling of Innovation Equilibria and Traps," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 659-694, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sectarianism Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Agent-based modelling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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