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Market-Based Alternatives for Managing Congestion at New York’s LaGuardia Airport

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Abstract

We summarize the results of a project that was motivated by the expiration of the “High Density Rule,” which defined the slot controls employed at New York’s LaGuardia Airport for more than 30 years. The scope of the project included the analysis of several administrative measures, congestion pricing options and slot auctions. The research output includes a congestion pricing procedure and also the specification of a slot auction mechanism. The research results are based in part on two strategic simulations. These were multi-day events that included the participation of airport operators, most notably the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, FAA and DOT executives, airline representatives and other members of the air transportation community. The first simulation placed participants in a stressful, high congestion future scenario and then allowed participants to react and problem solve under various administrative measures and congestion pricing options. The second simulation was a mock slot auction in which participants bid on LGA arrival and departure slots for fictitious airlines.

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  • Michael O. Ball & Lawrence M. Ausubel & Frank Berardino & Peter Cramton & George Donohue & Mark Hansen & Karla Hoffman, 2007. "Market-Based Alternatives for Managing Congestion at New York’s LaGuardia Airport," Papers of Peter Cramton 07mbac, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2007.
  • Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07mbac
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    File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2005-2009/ball-et-al-managing-congestion-at-laguardia.pdf
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    1. Ausubel Lawrence M & Milgrom Paul R, 2002. "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-44, August.
    2. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Crampton & Paul Milgrom, 2004. "The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design," Discussion Papers 03-034, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    3. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Auctioning Many Divisible Goods," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 480-493, 04/05.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pellegrini, Paola & Bolić, Tatjana & Castelli, Lorenzo & Pesenti, Raffaele, 2017. "SOSTA: An effective model for the Simultaneous Optimisation of airport SloT Allocation," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 34-53.
    2. Peter Cramton, 2009. "Innovation and Market Design," NBER Chapters,in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 9, pages 113-137 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Vikrant Vaze & Cynthia Barnhart, 2012. "An assessment of the impact of demand management strategies for efficient allocation of airport capacity," International Journal of Revenue Management, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 6(1/2), pages 5-27.
    4. Madas, Michael A. & Zografos, Konstantinos G., 2010. "Airport slot allocation: a time for change?," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 274-285, August.
    5. Swaroop, Prem & Zou, Bo & Ball, Michael O. & Hansen, Mark, 2012. "Do more US airports need slot controls? A welfare based approach to determine slot levels," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1239-1259.
    6. Kim, Amy & Hansen, Mark, 2015. "Some insights into a sequential resource allocation mechanism for en route air traffic management," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 1-15.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; airport slot auctions; combinatorial auctions;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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