Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction
We study the investment of a telecommunications incumbent in quality and in cost reduction when an entrant can use its network through unbundling of the local loop. We fi?nd that unbundling may lower incentives for quality improvements, but raises incentives for cost reduction. Therefore, it is not true that all types of investment are crowded out with unbundling. If the regulator can commit to a socially optimal unbundling price before investment, the incumbent makes both types of investment. In the absence of commitment, the incumbent will not invest, so that unbundling regulation may lower welfare as compared to no regulation.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2007|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Rua laura Alves, no.4 7o, 1050-138 Lisboa|
Phone: (351) 21 790 20 00
Fax: (351) 21 790 20 99
Web page: http://www.autoridadedaconcorrencia.pt/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bourreau, Marc & Dogan, Pinar, 2005.
"Unbundling the local loop,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 173-199, January.
- M. Bourreau & P. Dogan, "undated". "Unbundling the Local Loop," Working Paper 33648, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, September.
- Chang, Hsihui & Koski, Heli & Majumdar, Sumit K., 0. "Regulation and investment behaviour in the telecommunications sector: policies and patterns in US and Europe," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(10-11), pages 677-699, November.
- Vareda, João & Hoernig, Steffen, 2007. "The race for telecoms infrastructure investment with bypass: Can access regulation achieve the first best?," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp524, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
- Bastos Vareda, João Miguel & Hoernig, Steffen, 2007. "The Race for Telecoms Infrastructure Investment with Bypass: Can Access Regulation Achieve the First-best?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6203, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- João Vareda & Steffen Hoernig, 2007. "The race for telecoms infrastructure investment with bypass: Can access regulation achieve the first best?," Working Papers 29, Portuguese Competition Authority.
- Biglaiser, Gary & Ma, Ching-To Albert, 1999. "Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 215-235, November.
- Gary Biglaiser & Ching-to Albert Ma, 1996. "Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm," Papers 0067, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Biglaiser, G. & Ma, C.T.A., 1996. "Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 340.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Biglaiser, G. & Ma, C.A., 1996. "Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm," Papers 67, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 925-972, December.
- Kotakorpi, Kaisa, 2006. "Access price regulation, investment and entry in telecommunications," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 1013-1020, September.
- Spence, Michael, 1976. "Product Differentiation and Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 407-414, May.
- Foros, Oystein, 2004. "Strategic investments with spillovers, vertical integration and foreclosure in the broadband access market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-24, January.
- Guthrie, Graeme, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Working Paper Series 3851, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
- Cabral, Luis M B & Riordan, Michael H, 1989. "Incentives for Cost Reduction under Price Cap Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 93-102, June.
- de Bijl, P.W.J. & Peitz, M., 2004. "Unbundling the Local Loop : One-Way Access and Imperfect Competition," Discussion Paper 2004-025, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Cambini, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso M., 2004. "Access charges and quality choice in competing networks," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 391-409, September.
- Valletti, Tommaso M., 0. "The theory of access pricing and its linkage with investment incentives," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(10-11), pages 659-675, November. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)