Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets
We consider an unregulated incumbent who owns a broadband infrastructure and decides on how much access to provide to a potential entrant. The level of access determines the amount of investment the entrant needs to undertake to enter the market, and the intensity of post-entry competition. We show that the equilibrium level of access is higher when the sensitivity of product differentiation to the level of access is lower, and when the investment cost is higher. We also show that the incumbent sets a suboptimally low (high) level of access if the degree of service differentiation is sufficiently high (low).
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 11 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.degruyter.com|
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rne|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- João Vareda, 2007.
"Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction,"
31, Portuguese Competition Authority.
- Vareda, João, 2007. "Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp526, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
- M. Bourreau & P. Dogan, "undated".
"Unbundling the Local Loop,"
33648, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Dogan, Pinar & Bourreau, Marc, 2005.
""Build or Buy" Strategies in the Local Loop,"
Working Paper Series
rwp05-060, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Marc Bourreau & Johan Hombert & Jérôme Pouyet & Nicolas Schutz, 2011.
"Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms,"
- Marc Bourreau & Johan Hombert & Jerome Pouyet & Nicolas Schutz, 2011. "Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 677-713, December.
- Marc Bourreau & Johan Hombert & Jérôme Pouyet & Nicolas Schutz, 2010. "Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms," PSE Working Papers hal-00440126, HAL.
- Ingo Vogelsang, 2003. "Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(3), pages 830-862, September.
- Arya, Anil & Mittendorf, Brian & Sappington, David E.M., 2008. "Outsourcing, vertical integration, and price vs. quantity competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-16, January.
- Philip Gayle & Dennis Weisman, 2007. "Are input prices irrelevant for make-or-buy decisions?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 195-207, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:11:y:2012:i:1:n:1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.