Racing for Investment under Mandatory Access
We analyze the impact of mandatory access on a race for investments and show that for a low (high) access price, firms wait (preempt each other). An access price increase tends to accelerate investment in general but may delay the first investment. While the first best cannot be achieved with a time-invariant access tariff, simple instruments such as ending access at a preset date or granting access holidays can improve efficiency. The former forces earlier investment when it would happen too late otherwise, while the latter allows for lower access prices later in order to delay a business-stealing second investment.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.degruyter.com|
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hori, Keiichi & Mizuno, Keizo, 2006. "Access pricing and investment with stochastically growing demand," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 795-808, July.
- Kotakorpi, Kaisa, 2006. "Access price regulation, investment and entry in telecommunications," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 1013-1020, September.
- João Vareda & Steffen Hoernig, 2007.
"The race for telecoms infrastructure investment with bypass: Can access regulation achieve the first best?,"
29, Portuguese Competition Authority.
- Vareda, João & Hoernig, Steffen, 2007. "The race for telecoms infrastructure investment with bypass: Can access regulation achieve the first best?," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp524, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
- Bastos Vareda, João Miguel & Hoernig, Steffen, 2007. "The Race for Telecoms Infrastructure Investment with Bypass: Can Access Regulation Achieve the First-best?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6203, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gans, Joshua S, 2001. "Regulating Private Infrastructure Investment: Optimal Pricing for Access to Essential Facilities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 167-189, September.
- Brito, Duarte & Pereira, Pedro & Vareda, João, 2010.
"Can two-part tariffs promote efficient investment on next generation networks?,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 323-333, May.
- Duarte Brito & Pedro Pereira & João Vareda, 2008. "Can Two-Part Tariffs Promote Efficient Investment on Next Generation Networks?," Working Papers 34, Portuguese Competition Authority.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:67. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.