Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US
This paper incorporates Nash bargaining, credible bargaining and efficiency wages as special cases of an over-arching model of wage determination in a matching model that is used to assess econometrically how well each fits US data.� With Nash bargaining, estimates for worker bargaining power and the value of non-work activity are almost identical to those calibrated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).� However, the over-identifying restrictions are overwhelmingly rejected statistically, as they are for credible bargaining.� Efficiency wages fit the data better, with the over-identifying restrictions not rejected statistically, and result in a lower, more plausible estimated value of non-work activity.
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