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Veiling

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  • Jean-Paul Carvalho

Abstract

Veiling among Muslim women is modelled as a form of cultural resistance which inhibits the transmission of secular values. Individuals care about opinions of their community members and use veiling to influence these options. Our theory predicts that veiling is highest when individuals from highly religious communities interact in highly secular environments. This accounts for puzzling features of the new veiling movement since the 1970s. Though veiling helps retain religious values, we show that bans on veiling aimed at assimilation can be counterproductive. By inducing religious types to segregate in local communities, bans on veiling can lead to increased religiosity.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Paul Carvalho, 2010. "Veiling," Economics Series Working Papers 491, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:491
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    File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper491.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Austen-Smith & Roland G. Fryer, 2005. "An Economic Analysis of "Acting White"," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(2), pages 551-583.
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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Veiling bans can be counterproductive
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-08-04 18:52:00

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Veil; Islamic revival; Signalling; Identity; Economics of religion;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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