A Model of Delegated Project Choice With Application to Merger Policy
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References listed on IDEAS
- Ricardo Alonso & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "Optimal Delegation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 259-293.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
- Armstrong, M., 1994. "Delegation and discretion," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9421, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof, 2007. "A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control," Working Paper Series 686, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Joseph Farrell & Michael Katz, 2006. "The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 2.
- Baker, George & Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1999. "Informal Authority in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 56-73, April.
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- Weese, Eric, 2008.
"Political Mergers as Coalition Formation : Evidence from Japanese Municipal Amalgamations,"
CCES Discussion Paper Series
5, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Eric Weese, 2008. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: Evidence from Japanese Municipal Amalgamations," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd08-017, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
More about this item
KeywordsDelegation; Principal-Agent; Search; Merger Policy;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-09-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-09-09 (Business Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2007-09-09 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
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