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Successful and Dead-end Jobs in a Bureaucracy:Evidence from Japan

Author

Listed:
  • Kenta Kojima

    (Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics, Kansai University)

  • Katsuya Takii

    (Professor, Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University)

Abstract

This paper develops a novel method that assigns a job a value to capture both the likelihood and speed of promotion from each job to a top executive and applies it to investigate the career paths of bureaucrats in Japan. We find that outwardly similar jobs within the same hierarchical rank, estimated using the standard method in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), have very different opportunities to be promoted to a top executive. We can also detect frequent real demotions and the presence of early selection (read fast track) of elite bureaucrats unable to be detected through use of hierarchical rank.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenta Kojima & Katsuya Takii, 2019. "Successful and Dead-end Jobs in a Bureaucracy:Evidence from Japan," OSIPP Discussion Paper 19E008, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
    • Handle: RePEc:osp:wpaper:19e008
    as

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    File URL: http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2019/DP2019E008.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Human Internal labor market; Career paths; Promotion; Fast track; Bureaucracy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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