IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osk/wpaper/1520.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Cross-Shareholdings and Information Environment

Author

Listed:
  • Katsuhiko Muramiya

    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

  • Tomomi Takada

    (the Carroll School of Management, Boston College and the Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University)

Abstract

We examine the relationship between cross-shareholdings and the information environment. This issue is important because the separation of ownership and control al- lows managers to act exclusively in their own interests. Despite numerous studies on the influences of other types of ownership structures, including family, institutional investor, and block ownership structures, little is known about how cross-shareholdings influence management incentives. We highlight the Japanese market, where cross-shareholding is historically one of the prominent ownership structures. Using a unique database detail- ing the level of cross-shareholdings, we find that higher cross-shareholdings relate to (1) greater information asymmetry in the market, (2) higher earnings quality, and (3) lower firm value. The results are consistent with the quiet life hypothesis, which predicts man- agement avoids difficult decisions and costly actions when isolated from market pressures.

Suggested Citation

  • Katsuhiko Muramiya & Tomomi Takada, 2015. "Cross-Shareholdings and Information Environment," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 15-20, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:1520
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1520.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Francis, Jennifer & LaFond, Ryan & Olsson, Per & Schipper, Katherine, 2005. "The market pricing of accruals quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 295-327, June.
    2. Kubota, Keiichi & Takehara, Hitoshi, 2009. "Information based trade, the PIN variable, and portfolio style differences: Evidence from Tokyo stock exchange firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 319-337, June.
    3. Kang, Jun-Koo & Stulz, Rene M, 1996. "How Different Is Japanese Corporate Finance? An Investigation of the Information Content of New Security Issues," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 109-139.
    4. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    5. Duarte, Jefferson & Young, Lance, 2009. "Why is PIN priced?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 119-138, February.
    6. David Easley & Soeren Hvidkjaer & Maureen O'Hara, 2002. "Is Information Risk a Determinant of Asset Returns?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 2185-2221, October.
    7. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003. "Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1043-1075, October.
    8. Giroud, Xavier & Mueller, Holger M., 2010. "Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 312-331, March.
    9. Paul Hribar & Daniel W. Collins, 2002. "Errors in Estimating Accruals: Implications for Empirical Research," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 105-134, March.
    10. Attig, Najah & Fong, Wai-Ming & Gadhoum, Yoser & Lang, Larry H.P., 2006. "Effects of large shareholding on information asymmetry and stock liquidity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(10), pages 2875-2892, October.
    11. Easley, David & O'Hara, Maureen, 1987. "Price, trade size, and information in securities markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 69-90, September.
    12. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    13. Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, 2007. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(2), pages 331-372, June.
    14. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    15. Mitchell A. Petersen, 2009. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 435-480, January.
    16. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Balakrishnan, Karthik & Cohen, Daniel, 2012. "Corporate governance and the information environment: Evidence from state antitakeover laws," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 185-204.
    17. Miguel A. Ferreira & Paul A. Laux, 2007. "Corporate Governance, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Information Flow," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(2), pages 951-989, April.
    18. Hoshi, Takeo & Kashyap, Anil & Scharfstein, David, 1990. "The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 67-88, September.
    19. Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, 2000. "Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(2), pages 867-891, April.
    20. Ronald W. Masulis & Peter Kien Pham & Jason Zein, 2011. "Family Business Groups around the World: Financing Advantages, Control Motivations, and Organizational Choices," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(11), pages 3556-3600.
    21. Heflin, Frank & Shaw, Kenneth W., 2000. "Blockholder Ownership and Market Liquidity," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(4), pages 621-633, December.
    22. Almeida, Heitor & Park, Sang Yong & Subrahmanyam, Marti G. & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2011. "The structure and formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 447-475, February.
    23. Fan, Joseph P. H. & Wong, T. J., 2002. "Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 401-425, August.
    24. Glosten, Lawrence R. & Milgrom, Paul R., 1985. "Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 71-100, March.
    25. Gul, Ferdinand A. & Kim, Jeong-Bon & Qiu, Annie A., 2010. "Ownership concentration, foreign shareholding, audit quality, and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from China," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 425-442, March.
    26. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
    27. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, 2000. "Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights," NBER Chapters, in: Concentrated Corporate Ownership, pages 295-318, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    28. Dechun Wang, 2006. "Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 619-656, June.
    29. Jones, Jj, 1991. "Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 193-228.
    30. Verrecchia, Robert E., 1983. "Discretionary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 179-194, April.
    31. Ali, Ashiq & Chen, Tai-Yuan & Radhakrishnan, Suresh, 2007. "Corporate disclosures by family firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 238-286, September.
    32. Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, 1999. "Banks and Corporate Control in Japan," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(1), pages 319-339, February.
    33. Kothari, S.P. & Leone, Andrew J. & Wasley, Charles E., 2005. "Performance matched discretionary accrual measures," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 163-197, February.
    34. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Guay, Wayne R. & Weber, Joseph P., 2010. "The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 179-234, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Attig, Najah & Chen, Ruiyuan & El Ghoul, Sadok & Guedhami, Omrane & Kwok, Chuck & Pittman, Jeffrey, 2020. "Are insiders equal? Evidence from earnings management in closely held East Asian firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    2. Li, Ting & Zaiats, Nataliya, 2017. "Information environment and earnings management of dual class firms around the world," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 1-23.
    3. Katsuhiko Muramiya & Tomomi Takada, 2020. "How cross‐shareholding influences financial reporting: Evidence from Japan," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 309-326, September.
    4. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Balakrishnan, Karthik & Cohen, Daniel, 2012. "Corporate governance and the information environment: Evidence from state antitakeover laws," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 185-204.
    5. Byun, Hae-Young & Choi, Sunhwa & Hwang, Lee-Seok & Kim, Robert G., 2013. "Business group affiliation, ownership structure, and the cost of debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 311-331.
    6. Audrey Wenhsin Hsu & Sophia Hsintsai Liu, 2018. "Parent-subsidiary investment layers and the value of corporate cash holdings," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 651-681, October.
    7. Sakawa, Hideaki & Ubukata, Masato & Watanabel, Naoki, 2014. "Market liquidity and bank-dominated corporate governance: Evidence from Japan," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 1-11.
    8. Hsu, Audrey Wen-hsin & Liu, Sophia Hsin-Tsai, 2016. "Organizational structure, agency costs, and accrual quality," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 35-60.
    9. Yeh, Yin-Hua & Liao, Chen-Chieh, 2020. "The impact of product market competition and internal corporate governance on family succession," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    10. Elisabete F. Simões Vieira, 2016. "Earnings Management in Public Family Firms under Economic Adversity," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 26(2), pages 190-207, June.
    11. Gur Aminadav & Elias Papaioannou, 2020. "Corporate Control around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(3), pages 1191-1246, June.
    12. Sumon Kumar Bhaumik & Andros Gregoriou, 2010. "‘Family’ Ownership, Tunnelling And Earnings Management: A Review Of The Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 705-730, September.
    13. Ruqia Shaikh & Guo Fei & Muhammad Shaique & Muhammad Rizwan Nazir, 2019. "Control-Enhancing Mechanisms and Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence from Pakistan," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-23, August.
    14. Trinh, Quoc Dat & Haddad, Christian & Salameh, Elie, 2023. "Financial institutional blockholders and earnings quality: Do blockholders contestability and countries' institutions matter?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    15. Chandera, Yane & Utama, Cynthia Afriani & Husodo, Zaäfri Ananto & Setia-Atmaja, Lukas, 2018. "The co-insurance effect hypothesis and the cost of bank loans: Evidence from Indonesian pyramidal business groups," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 100-122.
    16. Khosa,Amrinder & Ahmed,Kamran & Henry,Darren, 2019. "Ownership Structure, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Valuation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108492195, October.
    17. Ebihara, Takashi & Kubota, Keiichi & Takehara, Hitoshi & Yokota, Eri, 2014. "Market liquidity, private information, and the cost of capital: Market microstructure studies on family firms in Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 1-13.
    18. Cieslak, Katarzyna & Hamberg, Mattias & Vural, Derya, 2021. "Executive compensation disclosure, ownership concentration and dual-class firms: An analysis of Swedish data," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 45(C).
    19. Hoang Luong Luong & Huong Giang (Lily) Nguyen & Xiangkang Yin, 2015. "When Is a Firm's Information Asymmetry Priced? The Role of Institutional Investors," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 15(1), pages 55-88, March.
    20. Byun, Hae-Young & Hwang, Lee-Seok & Lee, Woo-Jong, 2011. "How does ownership concentration exacerbate information asymmetry among equity investors?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 511-534, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; cross-shareholding; information asymmetry; earnings quality; firm value;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:1520. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: The Economic Society of Osaka University (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feosujp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.