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The ECB and the inflation monsters: strategic framing and the responsibility imperative (1998-2023)

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  • Fontan, Clément
  • Goutsmedt, Aurélien

    (UC Louvain - F.R.S-FNRS)

Abstract

The recent resurgence of inflation in Europe has led the ECB to increase interest rates and phase out asset purchase programs designed to address the effects of the Great Financial Crisis. This article investigates how the ECB adjusts its logic of responsibility throughout this series of crises. Using a topic model and in-depth analysis of speeches, we examine the ECB's strategic framing of causal linkages related to inflation during three historical periods: the Central Bank Independence (CBI) era (1998-2011), the secular stagnation era (2011-2021), and the new inflation era (2021-). Our findings indicate that modifications made to the CBI's causal linkages during the secular stagnation era shaped the ECB's framing of the new inflation era in a novel way. However, despite acknowledging difficult policy tradeoffs, which they tended to obscure in the past, ECB policymakers still seek to uphold the imperative of responsibility by adapting it to varying policy contexts.

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  • Fontan, Clément & Goutsmedt, Aurélien, 2023. "The ECB and the inflation monsters: strategic framing and the responsibility imperative (1998-2023)," SocArXiv 92r54, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:92r54
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/92r54
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    References listed on IDEAS

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